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ABSTRACT
        Interest in the potential effects of different systems for organizing work and managing employees on
the performance of organizations has a long history in the social sciences.  The interest in economics,
arguably more recent, reflects a general concern about the sources of competitiveness in organizations.  A
number of methodological problems have confronted previous attempts to examine the relationship between
work practices and the performance of firms.  Among the most intractable has been a concern about
establishing causation given heterogeneity biases in what have typically been cross-sectional data.  The
results from prior literature are suggestive of important productivity effects but remain inconclusive.  
            To address the major methodological problems we use a national probability sample of
establishments, measures of work practices and performance that are comparable across organizations,
and most importantly a unique longitudinal design incorporating data from a period prior to the advent of
high performance work practices.  Our results suggest that work practices that transfer power to
employees, often described as “high performance” practices, may rise productivity, although the statistical
case is weak.  However, we also find that these work practices on average raise labor costs per employee.
The net result is no apparent effect on efficiency, a measure that combines labor costs and labor
productivity.  While these results do not appear to be consistent with the view that such practices are good
for employers, neither do they suggest that such practices harm employers.  They are, however, consistent
with the view that these practices raise average compensation and hence may be good for employees.
Overall, then, the evidence suggests that firms can choose “high road” human resources practices that raise
employee compensation without necessarily harming their competitiveness.
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Arguments suggesting that alternative systems for managing employees and organizingtheir
work might lead to superior employee performance and, in turn, superior organizational performance go
back at least to the beginnings of industrialization. The original focus was on ownership structures, with
the view that employee cooperatives and other forms of employee governance might not only be more
just but might provide superior performance as well (see, e.g., Webb and Webb 1965 inthe U.K., or
Commons 1970 in the U.S.). Forceful critiques arose early in the 20th century in reaction to the mass
production factory system that was heavily influenced by industrial engineers like Frederick Taylor.
Entire academic fields like industrial psychology and industrial relations can trace their roots at least in
part to these critiques. Although they became more sophisticated anddifferentiated over time, the
alternative models all share the view that mass production systems sharply limit the control and decision-
making autonomy of employees, ignoring important psychological and social needs of employeesin the
process. As a result, they not only fail to tap important sourcesof motivation and ideas from employees
but in many cases cause employees to withhold effort and compliance with management directions.
Recent studies attempting to estimate the benefits associated with these "high performance"
work practices are suggestive of important effects but, taken as a group, remain inconclusive. In this
study, we use a national probability sample of establishments, measures of work practices and
performance that are comparable across organizations, and most importantly a unique longitudinal
design incorporating data from a period prior to the advent of high performance work practices.
Together, these features of our study address the central methodological problems that have plagued past
research. Our results suggest that work organization practices that expand employee involvement. often
described as "high performance" practices, do not have an unambiguous effect on productivity (sales per
employee), although the estimates tend to point to positive effects. There is strongerevidence that these
work practices on average raise labor costs per employee, controlling for labor quality. Because the mostimportant aspect of labor costs is compensation, higher labor costs per employee would seem to benefit
workers even though they are a liability, other things equal, for employers. The final result is that there
appears to be no net effect on labor efficiency, a measure that combines the effects on labor costand
labor productivity.1 While these results do not appear to be consistent with the view that such practices
are good for employers, neither do they suggest that such practices harm employers. Overall, the
evidence suggests that firms can choose "high road" human resources practices that raise employee
compensation without necessarily affecting their competitiveness.
II. Related Research on Work Organization
The research on work organization and the attempts at reforming it is vast, and only a cursory
review is attempted here, with an emphasis on more recent empirical research on the effects of work
practices on organizational performance.2
Early Case Studies
Perhaps the earliest research attempting to evaluate the effects of alternative working systems
were the Western Electric studies beginning in the 1920s, inductive research that both "discovered"
many of the alternative principles for organizing work and evaluated the benefits from them
(Roethlisberger and Dickerson 1943). Although there is some debate about what these studies actually
show, most observers believe that the reforms put in place in those studies illustrated that individual and
group performance could be enhanced by systems that acknowledge the need for social interaction and
the role that group norms play in shaping work performance.
The next important set of studies, also case studies, were conducted some 20 years later in the
U.K., originally in the mining industry (see, e.g., Trist 1981). They concluded that individual and group
performance could be improved through work systems that recognized the interplay between new
technology and work systems, hence the label "sociotechnical" for these studies. These studies were
Note that this does not refer to technical efficiency in the economic sense of being on the production frontier, but
rather efficiency in the sense of cost minimization by minimizing unit labor costs.
2reacting not so much to mass production systems per se but to piece rates and the individualized
incentive arrangements that were often part of such systems. The focus of the interventions was to
expand the use of teams and the authority they had over workplace decisions. The interventions
examined in these studies had the feel of experiments, although they did not necessarily meet all the
characteristics of experimental design. And while there were no systematic evaluations of the outcomes
of sociotechnical interventions, the case studies suggested substantial improvements in organizational
performance. As with most studies of work organization, they examined the effects on individual work
and workgroup productivity, not factoring in costs or examining relationships with overall firm
performance. These studies had relatively little influence on U.S. industry but considerable influence in
Scandinavia, especially Sweden.
Individual-Level Studies
The next generation of studies were more explicitly psychological in their orientation, focusing
on the individual as the unit of analysis and psychological factors as explanations, in contrast to the prior
studies where social relationships among workers or between workers and technology were emphasized.
These new studies were motivated by the notion that the basic psychological needs that workers have
were often unfulfilled by the nature of the tasks they performed. Analysis based on this framework was
first made popular with the work of Herzberg (1966) and became a common research model by the late
1970s (e.g., Hackman and Oldham 1980). The interventions considered in this research were at the level
of specific tasks that individual workers performed in theirjobs. As with earlier research, the focus of
attention was production work, and the main theories represented a counterpoint to the systems of work
organization associated with scientific management. There were two broad types of studies in this
literature. The first focused explicitly on employee involvement in decisions affecting their jobs. The
second focused on the specific tasks that employees performed, with an important aspect typically being
2Thereare many good reviews of the work reform literature. Among recent ones are Cotton (1993) and Appelbaum
and Batt (1994).
3the extent to which they had control over how tasks were performed. Butother aspects ofjobs also
played a role in these studies, such as the extent of varietyin the tasks workers performed or the
understanding of the end product that their tasks served.
The majority of these studies used employee attitudes as the dependent variable, especially job
satisfaction. Cotton (1993) summarized the hundreds of studies examining work organizationissues
from the psychological perspective, most of which related innovations in work organizationto job
satisfaction or related concepts such as employee commitment. Few studies attempted toexamine
relationships with outcomes at the organizational level. Despite theincredible volume of research in this
tradition, it is relatively easy to summarize its conclusions. Systems of work organizationthat
empowered employees in decision making and jobs whose tasksenriched employees by meeting more of
their needs were generally associated with more positive job-related attitudes such assatisfaction.
Evidence that these innovations improved individual-level performance on measures such asabsenteeism
and turnover is somewhat more modest but still reasonably strong. As Cotton's review (1993)and others
conclude, however, that there were few studies that examined relationships betweenthese innovations
and organizational performance as measured by productivity, efficiency, or financial performance atthe
organizational level, and little evidence of positive relationships in thosefew studies.3
Organization-Level Studies
The psychological research on work organization continues to pursue studies of work practices
and individual outcomes. The more important innovation in the study of work systems duringthe 1990s
has been research specifically designed to examine relationships with organizational performance.Some
of the motivation for this research came from studies in the industrial organizationeconomics tradition
attempting to understand the components of profitability. Hansenand Wernerfelt (1989), for example,
Some industrial psychologists have made considerable efforts to assess the costsand benefits of specific human
resource practices (e.g., Cascio 1991). These assessments are primarily accountingcalculations that do not attempt
to estimate relationships with organization-level performance measures (e.g., theytotal the administrative costs of
replacing employees to assess turnover costs but do not necessarilyconduct empirical estimates of how turnover
affects organizational performance).
4found that internal characteristics of firms explained almost twice as much of the variance in profitability
between firms as did characteristics of the industry and the firm's position in it, the traditional
explanations for differences in profits. Rumelt (1991) found that only four percent of the variation in
profitability across business units could be accounted for by factors associated with the unit's industry.
Studies like these pointed to characteristics within the firm as the most likely source of differences in
performance, and a great many of the potential differentiating within-firm characteristics relate at least
indirectly to work practices or the way work is organized.
The primary motivation for research examining the effects of workplace practices on
organizational performance, however, was the growing interest in Japanese management practices (see
below), driven by concern about the inadequacies of U.S. manufacturing in general (e.g., Dertouzos, et
al. 1988). The initial interest in Japanese management focused on employee management and concepts
such as job rotation, teamwork, and practices that supported greater employee involvement (especially
training and employment security). The first wave of the new research on work practices and
organizational performance examined Japanese-influenced practices such as quality circles and found
them associated with increased productivity (Katz, et al. 1983; Katz, et al. 1985). Perhaps the most
influential research stemming from this interest was the International Motor Vehicle Project at MIT.
which provided evidence of the superiority of Japanese assembly plant operations, in terms of quality
and productivity, as compared with other producers (Womack, et al. 1990). Later, MacDuffie (1995)
examined the same cross-sectional data more rigorously and found that work practices including teams
and contingent compensation in combination with flexible production techniques led to higher quality
and lower hours of labor per unit of output.
The approach of concentrating on a single industry and examining productivity has the decided
advantage of ensuring that the performance measures are more comparable across observations. It also
allows observations to be taken from units of analysis closer to where work practices occur, unlike
5financial measures, such as shareholder value, which can only be obtained at the corporate level.
Financial measures can more easily be swamped by unrelated factors; the stock price of a huge
conglomerate like General Electric, for example, is likely to be driven by a wide range of factors in
addition to work practices. In addition, it is very difficult to measure work practices accurately across an
entire corporation. The downside of focusing on productivity is that it leaves open the question as to the
costs of those productivity gains and whether, on balance, they increase firm efficiency or performance;
this problem has been addressed in some, but not all, of the existing studies (see below). And the
downside of focusing on a single industry, of course, is that it limits the ability to generalize the results to
other settings.
A number of more recent studies followed the first wave of research on work practices and
organizational performance, focusing in large part on productivity-related performance measures.
Ichniowski, et al. (1997), for example, study steel finishing lines. They found that the introduction of
"innovative work practices," among which are included teams and incentive pay, were associated with
higher worker productivity, and that combinations of these practices yielded additional productivity
improvements. A follow-up study by Ichniowski and Shaw (1998), using data for Japanese plants as
well, reinforces the assertion in the prior study that there are synergies from introducing more of these
practices. Delery and Doty (1996) attempt to examine the same relationships in the banking industry,
albeit with cross-sectional data and a response rate of only 11 percent, and conclude that banks with
more formalized employment systems (including formal training and appraisal systems and internal
career opportunities) have higher returns on assets. Delery, et al. (1997) essentially repeat the study with
a sample of trucking companies, again with cross-sectional data but this time with a 36 percent response
rate. In this case, few of the much larger set of practices showed relationships either to cost ratios or
returns on earnings. Cappelli and Rogovsky (1998) find that employee performance in a sample of
public utilities is higher where employees are involved in decisions affecting work and individual tasks
6but is no higher where they are involved in decisions governing the terms and conditions of employment.
Ball (1999) compares the sales of call center employees within a telecommunications company operating
under traditional, mass production work systems to those using total quality management (TQM) systems
and self-directed teams. She finds higher performance associated with self-directed teams but no
performance effects associated with TQM systems.
Another set of relatively recent studies has attempted to examine the relationships between work
practices and overall firm-level performance using measures of financial outcomes. Ichniowski (1990)
was the first of these, attempting the conceptually difficult task of relating sets of employment practices
to firm-level financial performance. The low response rate (under seven percent) and small sample made
it difficult to draw robust conclusions from his cross-sectional data, but the results seemed to suggest that
a cluster of practices that included enriched job design was associated with higher financial performance
as compared to other clusters of practices. The fact that somewhat similar sets of practices were
associated with significantly worse performance could imply that there was a benefit to having just the
right combination of practices. However, this sensitivity also highlights the usual caveat about the
arbitrary nature of the clusters chosen to examine—given the large number of permutations possible
among the practices, the a priori argument for choosing any particular cluster must be compelling.
Cooke (1994) examines the effects of employee participation and group incentive compensation
plans (profit sharing and gain sharing) on value added per employee for a sample of manufacturing firms
in Michigan. He reports that employee participation plans have significant positive effects that are
bigger in union than in nonunion firms; positive effects of group-based incentives that are bigger in the
nonunion sector when implemented in the absence of employee participation; and larger effects ofjointly
implementing both sets of practices in the union sector. However, statistical tests of the differences
between union and nonunion firms were not reported, and only the difference with respect to
implementing employee participation appears large enough to be statistically significant. Cooke also
7finds that these work practices tend to increase wages, but by less than the effect on value added, so that
performance—as measured by the effect on value added minus the effect on wages—appears to be
enhanced by the same practices that boost value added. (Unfortunately, though, the statistical
significance of these effects is not reported.)
Huselid (1995) follows Ichniowski's (1990) approach with cross-sectional data from a sample of
publicly held companies with more than 100 employees. The data included 13 measures of employment
practices (some of which were taken from the Ichniowski study), including questions about work
practices and employee involvement. He uses factor analysis to construct two variables measuring the
extent of various work practices, some of which could be considered part of high performance practices,
and finds that greater use of such practices is associated with lower turnover and higher productivity per
employee. The results were somewhat less successful at explaining overall firm financial performance.
The factor capturing practices aimed at employee incentives was not significantly related to return on
assets, and the factor measuring work systems was weakly related to Tobin's q. He also examines the
question of synergies, mainly examining whether the practices were applied consistently across the
organization, and finds little evidence of such synergies. Data limitations apparently prevented
examining possible synergies between individual practices, the type of synergies that Milgrom and
Roberts (1985) and others saw as potentially most important.
Huselid and Becker (1996) conducted a panel study of the relationship between work practices
and organizational performance based on a 1994 follow-up survey (covering 1993) to Huselid's 1991
data. The study examines the same relationships as in the 1995 paper but uses the panel data to control
for unmeasured firm-level heterogeneity via firm fixed effects. When this is done, the cross-sectional
relationships become small and insignificant. As they note, the nature of their panel may have
contributed to the absence of an apparent relationship. First, firms that adopt practices early on may do
so because such practices are especially useful for them, while those that adopt them later on may have
8waited in part because the practices do not make as much sense for them. The latter group may, for
example, adopt them simply to follow trends or fads in their community, or after the costs of their
implementation falls. Situations where the incidence of a practice is already high in the first wave of a
panel imply that those who adopt the practice late in the sample period covered by the panel are late
adopters. To the extent that this is the case, fixed-effects estimates based on longitudinal data are likely
to focus more on the late adopters in the more recent period so that the estimates are based on firms for
whom the effects may not be as strong (see also Freeman and Kleiner 1998). (Longitudinal data
identifying when practices were introduced can help to address this problem as can data including the
earliest adopters, such as we use in this paper.)
The second potential problem that may have contributed to the absence of a relationship
concerns the exacerbation of measurement error that can occur in panel observations. The advantage of
panel data is that they provide information on changes in practices that is necessary for estimating fixed-
effects models. But such information is typically based on responses from more than one survey, which
can compound measurement error. The Huselid and Becker surveys are only two years apart, and the
work practices they study were already prevalent in 1991 with little difference in their use in 1991 and
1993 (Huselid and Becker 1996 p. 411). In such a case, the proportion of true changers relative to total
reported changers is likely to be much lower than the proportion of the true incidence relative to reported
incidence in a cross-section, because random misclassification of practices—if uncorrelated across years
of the panel—will generally contribute a higher proportion of the "changers" than it does of those using a
particular practice in a cross-section.4 The problem should be less severe the farther apart the
observations, as the rate of misclassification should remain the same, while the number of true changers
increases. Thus, estimates that rely on the difference in values for observations over a short panel
increase the role of measurement error and hence are likely to bias the estimated effects considerably
Freeman (1984) demonstrates that this is true as long as the rate of misclassification is moderate, and provides a
numerical example.
9more towards zero. The extent to which this is the case, and whether it negates the advantages of
addressing heterogeneity, depends on the extent of measurement error, its correlation over time, and the
magnitude of the heterogeneity bias. Regardless, though, when panel data estimates of the effects of
work practices are smaller (in absolute value) than cross-section estimates, we cannot tell whether this
result is due to a reduction of bias from heterogeneity or an exacerbation of bias from measurement
error, without additional information.5
Black and Lynch (1997) is perhaps most similar to the study we perform here, in part because
they use some of the same data from the 1994 National Employers Survey (NES) that we use (described
below). The authors examine some work organization practices, as well as other work-related or
management practices such as computer use, benchmarking, and recruiting strategies. Theirs is the only
study thus far to control for whether the quality of the workforce, as measured by education, changes
with these practices. This may well be a crucial confounding factor in analyses like these; a work
practice or management strategy associated with higher productivity may also be accompanied by a shift
to a more-skilled workforce. In that case, some of the gains in performance otherwise attributed to the
work practices might in fact be due to the more-skilled employees. Further, because the workforce
changes are likely to raise labor costs, it would be difficult to assess the true net effect of work practices
on profitability or efficiency unless changes in the workforce could be controlled. In other words,
measures of the relationship between particular work practices and organizational performance are more
likely to be accurate if they are estimated conditional on changes in workforce composition or quality
that might accompany the change in work practices. In addition, Black and Lynch attempt to control for
the problem of heterogeneity by using repeated observations over the 1988-1993 period taken from
matched data in the Bureau of the Census's Longitudinal Research Database (LRD). They construct a
within estimator in an attempt to generate more accurate estimates of the coefficients of the time-varying
Huselid and Becker (1996) propose a method of addressing this measurement error bias in the panel estimates,
which we discuss below. In using this method, results more consistent with the cross-sectional evidence were found
10variables (capital, labor, and materials). They then estimate the effects of work practices in a second
stage using the estimates from the first stage to form average residuals for each establishment, which
they regress on the work practices (and other) variables from the NES. Because they have no
information on work practices other than in 1993, the study effectively assumes that these practices and
other variables are fixed over the 1988-1993 period. This approach has two limitations, however. First,
as they acknowledge (p. 19), it does not correct for a correlation between unobserved establishment-
specific effects and work practices which is the heart of the heterogeneity problem and, as explained
below, is an issue that our approach addresses directly. Second, other evidence (see below) suggests that
the work practices under consideration have expanded considerably in the 1988-1993 period, which
makes it difficult to sustain the assumption necessary for their analysis that the incidence of work
practices was constant over this period.6
Black and Lynch conclude that work practices per se have little relationship to labor productivity
at the establishment level unless introduced in particular combinations with other work practices. For
example, TQM only appears to affect performance when a large proportion of employees is involved in
employee participation programs. Their results look only at productivity, and it would be important to
know what the effects are on other dimensions of performance such as costs and the efficiency with
which labor is used. As an example, Appelbaum, et al. (forthcoming) study the effects of work practices
within several manufacturing industries on both performance and labor costs, although using cross-
sectional data. They report that innovative work practices have little effect on establishment
performance, but are associated with higher compensation for employees.
Easton and Jarrell (1998) examine the effects of introducing one particular practice—TQM
programs—on the subsequent financial performance of publicly-held firms. Rather than relying on a
random sample, their technique compared a sample of firms that introduced these practices to a matched
only for one of the two performance measures they study.
11set of otherwise similar firms that did not introduce them. (Of course, whether this matched sample
eliminates bias from firm-level heterogeneity better than does a more conventional cross-section sample
depends on how well the match controls for unobservables potentially associated with these work
practices.) They find that firms that introduced TQM did better both in terms of traditional accounting
measures of financial performance and stock prices.
Summary
A summary of the research on work practices and organizational performance might go as
follows. Some innovative work practices seem to show positive relationships with organizational
performance. The results tend to be stronger for studies within industries than for studies across
industries, perhaps because measures of performance within industries are less contaminated by
extraneous factors, and hence more accurately measure true performance differences across firms. But
the measures used in industry studies, typically productivity, do not consider costs and therefore measure
only productivity and not overall performance or competitiveness. In addition, the results from industry
studies cannot be easily generalized. Some of the financial measures used in the other studies implicitly
assess costs and benefits and therefore set a higher threshold for judging performance. Only one
representative, national-level study found strong relationships between practices and financial
performance (Huselid 1995), although those results could not be replicated using conventional methods
with panel data (Huselid and Becker 1996). The other studies using financial outcomes found mixed
results with some finding positive effects associated with some practices.
Our reading from all of the prior research is that the relationships that have been examined
between work practices and performance outcomes show somewhat greater empirical support at the
individual level than at the organizational level. The stronger evidence at the organizational level
concerns productivity effects, whereas evidence on efficiency or overall performance effects, which
6Giventhat they are averaging productivity measures over years when, for some establishments, these work
practices were not in effect, we would expect any estimated effects to reflect some average of the effects of having
12factor in costs as well, is weaker and more sporadic. In addition, one might view the accumulated
evidence as somewhat weakened by the fact that the variables showing significant relationships often
differ across studies. Why apparently strong relationships between practices and performance at the
individual level might not aggregate up to the organizational level is an issue for speculation. The
relationships at the individual level may be so small that they are easily swamped by other factors, or
they may ultimately have little power to explain organizational performance. In addition, most of the
psychological studies that generated positive relationships at the individual level had few control
variables, and it is possible that the results in these studies are not very robust with respect to omitted
variables. Finally, few of these studies attempted to control for potential costs associated with these
outcomes. It might be, for example, that the practices raise individual performance but also costs,
perhaps in the manner that a wage premium might, which is why relationships with efficiency or
profitability are harder to find.
In addition to these concerns, organizational-level studies have also been limited by some
important methodological problems that may constrain finding stronger or at least more consistent
empirical relationships between work practices and performance. The next section summarizes these
methodological problems before outlining how we address them in our analyses.
III. Methodological Issues
Some of the problems facing existing studies relating work practices to organizational
performance are common to all efforts to examine organizational performance. There is a paucity of
representative samples because of the relative absence of surveys at the organizational level. Many of
the studies to date use samples from specific industries, which limits their size and generalizability,
while others use samples of convenience. Low response rates to surveys of organizations raise concerns
about selection biases. Problems in generating measures of organizational performance are also
common. As noted above, measures of productivity have the advantage of being meaningful and
implemented these practices (at different points in the past and no effect.comparable across organizations, especially when they are used within industries, but because they
ignore costs, it is difficult to tell much about efficiency or overall performance from them. Financial
measures are preferred in this regard, but many of these, such as shareholder value, are only available for
publicly-held companies. Also, shareholder value or profit and loss is only available for companies as a
whole, whereas the independent variables of interest are typically only in effect or measured for smaller
sub-units of the organization.
Other problems are more unique to the study of work practices. One important problem is the
basic issue of what dimensions of work practices to study and what proxies to use for these practices.
Becker and Gerhart (1996) note, for example, that many of the studies attempting to examine the effects
of work practices on organizational performance describe themselves as examining "high performance
work systems," but the set of practices that they use as proxies for those systems differ considerably.
More generally, there is often little overlap between studies in the practices examined and the proxies
used. In most cases, there is no common theory suggesting how the practices relate to performance. The
most glaring theoretical gap is in the analyses of synergies among practices. Although most studies
assert that there are positive interactions between practices, few present arguments as to how particular
practices should interact with each other, instead simply assuming that more practices are better.
Unfortunately, when researchers are presented with a wide array of possible work practices with little
theoretical guidance as to how they interact, data mining possibilities abound, perhaps leading
researchers to discover combinations of practices that appear to affect performance significantly in their
data sets but are not relationships likely to be robust across data sets. This is not an issue of data but
rather one of research design and strategy.
A more difficult problem to address in these studies is the issue of establishing causation, a
particular challenge because in most cases the data are cross-sectional. The possibility that firms or
establishments already performing well might have a greater ability and interest in adopting practices
14that have come to be labeled "best practices" implies that the apparent positive effect of work practices
on productivity or performance is not causal but rather may simply reflect firm- or establishment-level
heterogeneity.7 The issue of addressing heterogeneity to establish causation is, in our view, a central
problem plaguing prior research.
To summarize, a persuasive test of the effects of work practices on organizational performance
requires data that meet the following criteria. First, the sample should be representative of the
population of employers, and the data should ideally be drawn at a level of analysis sufficiently close to
where practices are established to expect relationships between practices and performance to hold.
Second, the outcomes studied should include not only productivity but also some performance measure
related to efficiency in order to assess whether productivity improvements are offset by cost increases.8
Third, the data (and research design) should make it possible to establish whether a causal relationship
exists between work practices and performance, accounting for the possibility that employers using
particular work practices are different in other ways that are correlated with performance. Prior research
has sometimes made advances along subsets of these criteria but has yet to address them all.
The analyses outlined below are similar to the organization-level studies reviewed in Section II
in that they examine work practices and their relationship with organization-level performance. They
differ from prior studies, and in our view represent an advance over them, because the characteristics of
the data used allow us to overcome the methodological problems outlined above. The surveys from
which the data are taken provide nationally representative samples of establishments and measures of
performance that are comparable across establishments, addressing the first two methodological
challenges noted above.
While this scenario is consistent with positive bias in regressions of performance measures on work practices, the
opposite is also possible, if firms in dire straits tend to adopt new work practices (Huselid and Becker, 1996, p. 403).
Relatedproblems are the possibility of reverse causation, or that firms that adopt "best practices" in organizing
work also adopt such practices in other areas, with the latter leading to improved organizational performance.
8Thereis something of a trade-off here in that units of analysis where such performance data—typically financial
data—are available may be at higher levels than the units where work practices are implemented.
15We are also able to match surveys to create panel data that allow us to address the issue of
heterogeneity/causation. In particular, we are able to form panels in which one of the waves was
conducted before the work organization practices under consideration were introduced. The ability to
identifS' performance before these work practices were introduced offers important advantages over
shorter panels of the type used by Huselid and Becker (996) to address the heterogeneity issue. First,
because we are not identifying the effects of work practices from "late adopters," we get closer to a true
"average" effect of these practices, at least on those establishments that have adopted them thus far.9
Second, and much more important, we avoid the issue of exacerbating measurement error that arises in
panels. If none of the work practices was in place as of the first wave of the panel, then the sample of
"changers" who statistically identify the effects of work practices when we difference the data consists of
the entire set of establishments using these practices in the later panel. This is in contrast to the small
subset of respondents who report changes in practices in short panels. That is, the work practices
"treatment" variables are exactly the same in the cross-section specification and the specification
incorporating fixed establishment effects, so there is no exacerbation of measurement error. Of course,
this strategy hinges crucially on the absence of these work practices in the period covered by the earlier
wave of the panel data set. A thorough discussion of this issue appears in Section VI, where we present
research- and survey-based evidence, and in the Appendix, where we document the earliest anecdotal
evidence and media reports of these work practices.
IV. Data and Measurement
Establishment-level surveys of employment practices conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the
Census for the National Center on the Educational Quality of the Workforce provide data that allow us to
address the methodological challenges outlined above that face analyses of the relationships between
work practices and organizational performance. The original National Employers Survey (NES I) was
In addition, if the effects of work practices take some time to emerge (or, in principle, to fade away), a long panel
makes it more likely that enough time has elapsed to reveal these effects.
16administered by the Bureau of the Census as a telephone survey in August and September of 1994 to a
nationally representative sample of private establishments with 20 or more employees. It is structured to
provide information about establishment performance and characteristics in 1993, although the questions
regarding work practices refer to the time of the survey (i.e., in 1994), possibly introducing slight
measurement error if there were some very recent introductions of these practices.'°
The survey over-sampled establishments in the manufacturing sector and establishments with
more than 100 employees. Public-sector employers, non-profit institutions, and corporate headquarters
were excluded from the sample, as were establishments with fewer than 20 employees. Establishments
with fewer than 20 employees represent approximately 85percentof all establishments in the U.S., but
those with more than 20 employees account for approximately 75percentof all workers (Lynch and
Black 1998). In addition, very small establishments are unlikely to be appropriate for or amenable to
studying work practices because their working arrangements are often so informal and variable
(changing day-to-day in response to even routine developments such as absenteeism) as to make it
difficult to respond in a meaningful way to questions about work systems.
In administering the NES, the target respondent was the plant manager in the manufacturing
sector and the local business site manager in the non-manufacturing sector. Other surveys have targeted
the human resource manager. But in surveying establishments, what we want to measure is how work is
actually done in the facility, not the policies that might exist in employee handbooks, and the best person
to ask about actual operating practices is the person in charge of the establishment, not the manager in
charge of personnel policies. The questionnaire was designed to allow for multiple respondents so that
information could be obtained from establishments that kept financial information, for example, in a
separate office—typically at corporate headquarters for multi-establishment enterprises. Computer
Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CAll) was used to administer each survey, which took approximately
28 minutes to complete.
10The1997 NES described below has the same structure.
17The sampling frame for the survey was the Bureau of the Census's Standard Statistical
Establishment List (SSEL), a comprehensive and up-to-date listing of establishments in the United
States. Of the 4,633 eligible establishments that were contacted by Census, only 1,275 refused to
participate in the survey. This represents a 72 percent response rate, which is substantially higher than
any of the other surveys used in the studies summarized above. The usual reason given by employers
about why they would not participate in the survey was that they did not participate in voluntary surveys
or were too busy to participate. Analysis of the characteristics of respondents and non-respondents
indicates that there was no significant pattern of differences at the two-digit industry level in the
likelihood of participating in the survey (Lynch and Black 1998). The only differentiating characteristic
of establishments less likely to participate was that manufacturing establishments with more than 1000
employees, constituting 0.1 percent of the sample, were less likely to do so. Of the 3,358 establishments
participating in the survey, not all respondents completed all parts of the survey by the interview cutoff
date of October 1, 1994, in which case they were excluded from the sample used below. The final
numbers of surveys in which all parts of the survey were completed were 1,621 establishments in the
manufacturing sector and 1,324 establishments in the non-manufacturing sector. This represents a 64
percent overall "completed" survey response rate.
The survey was repeated in August of 1997 (NES II), again administered by the U.S. Bureau of
the Census via CAT!. This survey covers 1996. The sampling frame was again drawn from the SSEL,
targeting business establishments throughout the United States, excluding those with fewer than 20
employees and the other types of employers mentioned earlier, and oversampling the nation's largest
establishments and those in the manufacturing sector. The sample for the NES II has three additional
components, including: an oversampling of states involved in particular educational reform efforts
(2,000 completed interviews in California, Kentucky, Michigan, Maryland, and Pennsylvania);
approximately 2,500 completed interviews that comprise a representative sample of the rest of the United
18States (45 states plus the District of Columbia); and a longitudinal component of about 900 completed
interviews with business establishments that had participated in the NES I. A total of 5,465
establishments responded to NES II for a response rate of 78 percent.1 1 The NES II data became
available for use at the Bureau of the Census in January 1998.
Finally, labor costs per worker is a crucial performance measure in our analysis and is available
in NES II but not NES j12 We therefore matched establishments in NES Ito data from the 1993 LRD
(or the 1992 LRD, if 1993 did not yield a match), to extract labor costs per worker.13 To maintain
consistency with the denominator of this variable, we also took total employment from the same
observation.14 The need to obtain labor cost data from the 1992 or 1993 LRD in using NES 1, and the
match to much earlier LRDobservationsin constructing our panels (discussed in the next section), limit
the analysis to manufacturing establishments, which constitutes the sampling frame of the LRD.
Figure 1 outlines the construction of the data sets we analyze, along with their sample sizes. For
completeness, we also present descriptive information on the short longitudinal panel based on the two
NES files even though we report no analyses with that short panel. Appendix Table Al provides further
details on the construction of the samples, in particular how the sample sizes change from the original
NES's as the various sample selection rules are imposed. The final products that we analyze are long
panels with 433 complete observations (i.e., after accounting for item non-response, data errors, etc.) for
the 1977-1993 panel, and 660 observations for the 1977-1996 panel. We also analyze a full 1993 cross-
"Therewere 915 respondents to the longitudinal component for a response rate of 88 percent. Excluding partial
responses brought the longitudinal sample down to 766 and a completed response rate of 74 percent.
12Weexperimented with estimating labor costs in NES I based on data on the proportion of costs accounted for by
labor (LC/TC) and other input costs, using the formula labor costs =((LC/TC)xotherinput costs)/(1 —(LC/TC)).
But these estimates were very noisy and did not replicate patterns expected and found in NES II, such as a negative
association with the percent female.
Although the sampling frame for NES I is the SSEL, the establishment size restrictions in the NES's and
oversampling or certainty sampling of large establishments lead to considerable overlap between NES I and the
1993 LRD. Thus, we obtain approximately 40 percent of matches from the 1993 LRD, and 60 percent from the
1992 LRD(whichincludes the entire Census of Manufacturers).
"Furtherdetails appear in the notes to Table 2.
19section with 663 observations, to incorporate information on workforce and plant-level controls not
available in the LRD.
Table 1 outlines the work practice variables used in the analyses, their definitions in the survey,
and descriptive statistics about them across surveys. The surveys asked a number of questions about
work practices, with a particular focus on those that rely on employee involvement and related aspects of
transformed work systems. As Table I indicates, some of these work practice variables are available
only in NES I while the others are asked in both surveys. Rather than focusing only on NES I, though,
we have chosen to construct and analyze two long panels (1977-1993 and 1977-1996, the latter using
NES II) because of the importance of trying to establish robust results in this literature where, as noted
earlier, such robust results are lacking. The work practice variables available in at least one of the two
NES's are as follows:
TQM—Formal TQM programs include employee involvement as an explicit component of their
operations.
SELFMNG—Self-managed or autonomous teams give their members authority over decisions
that in other contexts are made by supervisors, such as how to perform their tasks or, in more
advanced situations, which tasks to perform.
MEET—Regularly scheduled meetings to discuss work-related problems include low-levels of
employee involvement, such as quality circles run by supervisors, as well as higher levels where
the employees manage the meetings and take decisions themselves.
TRNTEAM—Teamwork training is a proxy for how seriously the organization takes teamwork.
The argument is that, other things equal, establishments that invest in training teams are ones
that allow teams to handle more important tasks.
JOBROT—Job rotation is an aspect of job design that increases variety and employee
understanding of other aspects of the operation. It is also a central aspect of cross-functional
teams.
TRNCROS—Cross-training is a proxy for how seriously the establishment takes job rotation, and
teamwork generally to the extent that responsibilities are shared within teams. As above,
establishments that invest in training employees for other jobs should be much more likely to
make use of those skills by rotating employees across those jobs.
PAYSKIL—Pay-for-skill programs specify certain skills that are important for the organization
and then reward employees with increased compensation when they have acquired those skills.
20Pay-for-skill is typically viewed as an important complement to teamwork and especially job
rotation in that it supports learning the skills needed in such situations.
PSHR—Gainsharing, profit sharing, and related programs that provide employees a share in
improved performance of the establishment are typically seen as a strong complement to
employee involvement programs that give them the mechanism to contribute to greater
performance. (In fact, observers suggest that gainsharing without involvement is largely
ineffective.)
We also examine three other, different workplace practices that are sometimes associated with
innovative work systems, in order to provide some comparisons with the relationships above:
BENCH—Benchmarking is a formal system of learning about practices at other organizations. It
may also be a proxy for establishments that are in general more progressive about their practices.
COMPMNG and COMPWKR—The percentages of managerial and non-managerial employees
who use computers on their job capture two potentially different dimensions of computer use,
which has been the subject of considerable investigation in several other studies; the inclusion of
these variables here provides a point of comparison with those other studies. Further, many
observers believe that computer use is a signal or proxy for organizations that are more advanced
in their operations.
V. Empirical Approach
The longitudinal component of the NES can provide panel data, much like the data used by
Huselid and Becker (1996). The main drawback to this panel, as with their data, is that it covers a very
short period and one in which the overall use of the work practices surveyed was already high in the first
wave. This makes it likely that a high fraction of reported "changers" in use of work practices are
spurious, in which case fixed-effects estimates will be severely contaminated by measurement error and
likely to be more biased towards zero than the cross-section estimates.'5 In addition, the number of
changers is small, likely rendering the data uninformative. This latter suspicion was confirmed in
estimations using the short panel for many of the specifications discussed below. Estimated effects of
'Huselidand Becker (1996) provide a straightforward exposition of this well-known point for the case of
continuous variables. The extension to indicator variables (such as those measuring work practices) is more
complex (Freeman, 1984).
21work practices in fixed-effects (first difference) specifications were extremely imprecise. Hence, these
analyses are not reported in the paper.
Instead, we provide more informative fixed-effects analyses by constructing much longer panels
based on matching establishments in the 1994 and 1997 NES cross-sections to data on these
establishments prior to the introduction of the work practices we consider. In particular, we use the LRD
for the year 1977. The LRD does not offer information about work practices but does contain
information about establishment performance, productive inputs, and other plant- level characteristics and
variables. The LRDisa panel of establishments including all establishments in years in which a Census
of Manufacturers (CM) is carried out (years ending in a two or seven), and many fewer establishments in
intervening years (from the Annual Survey of Manufactures). Among CM years—for which the most data
are available—1977 is arguably the most recent period for which it is reasonable to assume that the work
practices under consideration in this study had not yet been introduced.
Indeed, the central assumption on which our empirical approach is based is that the relevant
work practices observed in the 1994 and 1997 NES's were introduced sometime after 1977. Under this
assumption, changes in establishment performance between 1977 and 1993/1996 that are associated with
the introduction of these practices (holding constant establishment-level characteristics, input use, and
other relevant controls) can be ascribed to the introduction of these work practices. This design
addresses the issue of causation that is otherwise confounded in cross-section estimates by heterogeneity
across establishments that is potentially correlated with both use of innovative work practices and
measures of organizational outcomes. Our "long panel" approach has the advantage of minimizing the
concern about panel data noted by Huselid and Becker (1996)—that measured changes in work practices
in a short panel beginning when these practices were already widespread are likely to be dominated by
measurement error. Here, we avoid that problem. We have one survey-based observation on the
establishment's work practices, and the other, implicit observation comes not from prior surveys but
22from outside evidence indicating strongly that the practices did not exist in 1977. Measurement error
may still exist in the 1993 or 1996 data. But because the "changers" that identify the effects of work
practices in the fixed-effects estimations consist of all establishments implementing such practices,
rather than those for whom reported use changed over a short period, the ratio of spurious to real changes
is almost surely radically lowered, and the estimates are therefore much less likely to be biased.'6
Finally, this research design has the additional advantage of not relying in any way on respondents who
discontinue use of work practices to identify the effects of these practices, which is advantageous given
that adopting and discarding such practices may not have symmetric effects (although in principle this
can be tested). A potential pitfall of the "long panel" analysis, however, is that establishment-level
unobservables may be less likely to be fixed over a long than a short period, in which case the fixed-
effects estimation is less likely to fully remove such unobservables.
Because the assumption that the relevant work practices were not in place before 1977 is crucial
to our empirical approach, we describe in detail the evidence for it in the next section and in the
Appendix.
VI. The Emergence of "High Performance" Work Systems
The common theme among the specific work practice variables considered in our study is an
underlying management strategy that attempts to tap into employee knowledge and motivation through
practices that permit greater employee involvement in workplace and job-related decisions. These
practices are sometimes referred to with the potentially confusing term "high performance" work
Huselid and Becker (1996) attempt to solve this problem in a different manner using their short panel. They use
factor analysis of a number of work practices to construct a single proxy for "high performance" work practices.
They then use estimates of Cronbach's "alpha" from their factor analysis as estimates of the reliability of readings
on this proxy over time. This strikes us as a controversial approach, however, because the authors do not really
have any information on the accuracy of the reports about these work practices. That is, they can evaluate the
statistical reliability of the factor(s) identified from their analysis but not of the underlying data used to construct the
factor(s). Thus, only if we accept the underlying data as accurate is their approach convincing; but, of course, the
accuracy of the data is the fundamental problem. Another potential problem is that they are unable to implement
their methods on regressions with any control variables.
23systems.'7 While a wide range of practices are sometimes included under that heading, they tend to
share this common theme.
Despite the incredible outpouring of research over time on the topic of transformed or "high
performance" work systems, there is little evidence that the concept had much influence on industry
through the 1970s. Several studies have attempted to understand why this academic interest did not
translate into practice (see, especially Bailey 1992; but also Pfeffer 1994 and 1998)i8 The human
relations movement underway following the Western Electric studies in practice never embraced
employee involvement or fundamental reform of scientific management principles, focusing instead on
paternalism and corporate communications in what many saw as cynical attempts to create a facade of
corporate interest in employee welfare (see, e.g., Dubin (1958) for a description of the human relations
approach). This movement died with the widespread institutionalization of industrial unionism in the
1950s. The sociotechnical studies had considerable influence in Swedish industry but essentially none in
U.S. industry.
The psychology-based studies ofjob design that began to be popular in the 1970s were virtually
all researcher-led experiments done on small subgroups of workers. One of the few examples where an
entire facility adopted some of these job design concepts was the Gaines Dog Food plant in Topeka,
Kansas, an experiment in the late I 970s that was studied so often that the researchers threatened to
overwhelm the facility (see Walton (1982) for a review of the plant's experience). Interest in quality-of-
worklife programs—essentially employee involvement in decisions concerning the conditions of the
workplace that affect them (but not job tasks or work systems)—developed in the 1970s in response to
concerns about poor morale that, in turn, may have contributed to declining productivity. The first
widely published material examining whether poor work practices were contributing to low morale was
The highly influential America's Choice (1989) report appears to have made the phrase "high performance work
practices" popular. The confusion comes from assumptions about the etymology of the name—whether these
practices have been already identified as associated empirically with superior performance on some dimension
(either of employees or of the organization), as many assume and some assert, or whether it is Just a name.
24in 1974 (O'Toole 1974), and the first arguments for redesigning work through employee involvement to
improve productivity came about three years later (see, e.g., Cumming and Malloy 1977). With the
exception of a few well-publicized cases in the union sector (where involvement tended to be through
union institutions rather than through individuals or teams), interest in reforming work practices along
these lines made little headway as employers confronted the more immediate problems of recessions in
1973-75 and in 1980.
The interest among employers in high performance work systems and employee involvement
more generally in the U.S. began in earnest following the rise of Japanese imports in manufacturing and
the conclusions that U.S. manufacturers eventually drew about the apparent superiority of Japanese
management practices. The most important concepts in Japanese manufacturing management as they
relate to work organization are TQM, quality circles, and job rotation. Quality circles were meetings of
production workers off-line to think of ways to improve quality. Quality circles were not teams,
however, in that they had no collective tasks to perform. They were directed by management and had no
autonomy in decision making (see Hill 1991). TQM involved having quality circles or other employee
groups use statistical process control to measure and improve quality. Job rotation meant moving
employees across different tasks in part to reduce fatigue, in part to create some variety to combat
boredom, and in part to create some sense of how their tasks fit into the overall project.
Interest in Japanese management practices in the U.S. lagged the rise of Japanese import
penetration by almost a decade. The popular books exposing the apparent advantages of Japanese
practices did not appear until the 1980s (see, e.g., Ouchi 1982; Pascal and Amos 1982). In the
automobile industry where Japanese success was most immediate, evidence indicates that U.S.
companies did not begin any serious attempts to learn from Japanese practices until well into the 1980s.
Indeed, it was not until Toyota began operating the New United Motors Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI)
8Onesimple hypothesis as to why employers were not embracing these practices that occurs to us is just that there
was not much evidence that they benefited employers, especially at the time.
25facility with General Motors in 1985 that U.S. auto makers began to believe that Japanese practices
would work in the U.S. (see Womack, et al. 1990). Most observers see Japanese-inspired work practices
then spreading from autos to other manufacturing and then to other industries (see, e.g., Kenny and
Florida 1993).
Survey data on the introduction of these innovative practices might be more persuasive than a
narrative account of their rise. But there are important caveats to the survey evidence. First, surveys
typically do not even take place until there is already enough awareness of practices to make the results
of interest. In this case, the first survey examining the incidence of transformed work practices in the
economy took place in 1982. Second, the early surveys in particular rarely had representative samples
(see below). Third, because the surveys sampled firms, rather than workplaces or establishments, and
asked about whether practices existed, rather than their coverage, it is difficult to gauge the true extent of
these practices. In such surveys, as noted below, a company like General Motors with 500,000
employees would be asked whether they had pay-for-skill, and the company would have to give a yes-or-
no answer about the company as a whole. Having the work practice anywhere in the company could lead
to a "yes" response even if coverage was extremely low. Bearing these caveats in mind, a review of
survey data on the introduction of these practices follows.
The first survey that asks employers about transformed work practices appears to be in 1982,
sponsored by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE Office of Research 1992). It sampled firms with
more than 100 employees with a response rate of 26 percent. The survey asked about approximately 17
categories of practices including such general ones as having formal training programs, with the response
choices being "yes" or "no." Of the firms surveyed, 85 percent had none of the 17 practices being
considered, including the very general items like formal training. With respect to specific practices
relating to transformed work systems, approximately two percent had job rotation, two percent had
production teams, and less than one percent had group productivity payments (although roughly four
26percent had profit sharing).'9 Again, these figures simply mean that the firm had the practice
somewhere in its organization.
A 1986 survey of 7,765 business units (albeit with a response rate of only 6.5 percent) sponsored
by the U.S. Department of Labor found roughly two percent of these units had work groups that were
allowed to manage themselves, about two percent had gainsharing (nearly three percent had profit
sharing), and roughly three percent had some form of employee involvement in decision making
someplace in their operations (Delaney, et al. 1989). Surveys conducted for the U.S. General Accounting
Office (GAO) of the 1000 largest firms in the U.S. in terms of sales (The Fortune 1000) in 1987 and
1990 show something about the diffusion of these practices both over time and within firms. With
respect to self-managed work teams, for example, the percentage of companies with these teams at least
somewhere in their very large organizations rose from 28 percent to 47 percent over this period. The
higher incidence in these surveys compared to the earlier ones may simply reflect the enormous scale of
these large firms compared to the smaller average size in the previous surveys.20 In neither period did
more than one percent of these companies have 40 percent or more of their employees in such teams.
These surveys also appear to be the first to ask about pay-for-skill. The percentage of these firms with
pay-for-skill somewhere in their organization was 60 percent in 1987, but then appears to have declined
to 51 percent in 1990 (Lawler, et al. 1992).
There are a number of other employer surveys examining various work practices since the late
l980s, and there is considerable variance in their reports of the incidence of these practices (see, e.g.,
Appelbaum and Batt 1994, Appendix A). Overall, however, the surveys seem to suggest considerable
expansion of these practices during the early 1990s. Osterman's 1992 national probability sample of
'Thesurvey reports the percentage of firms with given practices as a percentage of those firms reporting any
practices (that is, using the latter as the denominator). So in the text estimates of the percentage of firms in the
entire sample with a given practice are calculated by multiplying the reported percentage (in the study) by the
proportion with any practices.
20If,for example, one assumes that the average firm surveyed in the GAO study is many times larger than the
average firm or business unit surveyed in the earlier studies, then even with the sameincidence per employee, the
incidence of practices per employer would be many times greater in the GAO surveys.
27manufacturing establishments (with approximately a 50percentresponse rate), for example, found that
one-third of the establishments had TQM programs, 40 percent had self-directed teams, and 26 percent
had job rotation (Osterman 1994). Our data for 1993, in Table 1, indicate slightly higher levels of TQM.
Our job rotation and self-managed team questions ask about the percentage of employees covered, rather
than simply whether the establishment has them. Comparison of our 1993 and 1996 data suggests
growth in these practices across all of the work organization variables. This is true whether we compare
the 1994 and 1997 data available in our two long panels (columns 3 and 4), or simply use the maximum
number of observations on each work practice variable from the two cross-sections (columns I and 2); in
both cases, though, the samples of establishments in 1994 and 1997 are different.
To summarize the narrative and the survey evidence, the incidence of transformational work
practices based on principles of employee involvement appears to have been essentially nonexistent as of
the late 1970s and very low as of the early 1980s. Through the mid-1980s, innovations such as job
rotation, gainsharing, and teamwork of various kinds existed in only a small handful of firms with no
evidence that they were at all widespread within those firms. The introduction of these practices
expanded considerably in the early 1990s, however. One way to conceptualize the growth in these
practices is that, by 1992, survey results indicated that these practices were more common within
individual establishments than they were five years earlier anywhere within entire corporations.
Skeptics might argue that establishments might have had practices in place before 1977 that
looked like some of these practices even before the terms for them became common. The evidence
presented in the Appendix, which surveys the business press about examples of these practices and the
first mention of the terms, suggests otherwise. Firms with such practices would have had a strong
incentive to let the business community know about their practices and secure a reputation for
themselves as innovators, and the business press at the same time was seeking out examples of
innovative practices. And if such situations had been at all common, it is difficult to imagine that the
28concepts would have received much subsequent attention as "new," when in fact they were seen as quite
revolutionary after they appeared. Finally, recall that even when surveys first asked about the incidence
of these practices, well after the concepts were introduced, they were quite rare.
Thus, based on this array of evidence, we are comfortable using establishment observations from
the late 1970s to measure performance in the absence of "high performance" work practices.
Correspondingly, we believe that the high incidence of these practices in 1994 and 1997 using the NES
data generally indicates the true incidence of these practices. The following section describes our
empirical analysis that attempts to uncover the causal effects of these work practices on organizational
performance.
VII. Analyses and Results
The dependent variables we study as outcomes of the implementation of innovative work
practices are establishment sales per worker, total labor costs per worker, and the ratio of these, which is
a measure of the efficiency with which expenditures on labor are used. (This is the inverse of unit labor
costs.)21 Because the unit of analysis is the establishment, and most establishments are in multi-unit
firms, profitability calculations are potentially problematic.22 Most establishments in multi-
establishment firms are simply cost centers, and those that calculate profit-and-loss estimates do so based
on their own internal accounting principles, which implies that such estimates may not be comparable
across observations. In contrast, sales, receipts, or the value of shipments are comparable measures of
overall performance across establishments when controlling for industry.
One way to think about sales per worker and labor costs per worker is that they represent the
potential benefits of these work practices to employers and employees, respectively; other things equal,
21Alldependent variables are expressed in natural logs. With sales per worker and labor costs per worker expressed
in logs, the regression of the log of the ratio of these variables (equivalent to the difference of logs) produces
precisely the difference between the coefficients in the separate regressions, for each independent variable.
However, running the regression for this difference in logs permits us to easily read off the statistical significance of
the differential effects on productivity and labor costs, or equivalently on labor efficiency.
22
Nonetheless,estimates of profitability have been used for establishment data such as these (Hellerstein, et al.
1998).
29employers are better off with higher sales per employee, and employees are betteroff with higher labor
costs per employee assuming that these costs are compensation-related as they are in thiscase.23'24
Alternatively, we can think of these two variables as representing benefits and costs to employers.
Higher sales per worker, ceteris paribus, benefit the employer. But to say anythingabout net benefits, we
also need to know the effects of work practices on labor costs. Either way, combining information on
productivity and labor costs, as we do by using our labor efficiency measure, lets us assessthe extent to
which higher costs associated with these work practices might offset the higher productivity/sales they
may produce.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for these dependent variables in nominal terms.25 As
"background" information, Appendix Tables A2 and A3 report descriptive statistics for the establishment
and workforce characteristics used as control variables, as well as explaining the definition and
construction of these variables based on the NES's and additional calculations. Finally, Appendix Table
A4 reports estimates of the baseline specifications including all of the controls used, without the work
practice variables, for the various specifications we consider. These estimates replicate broadfeatures of
findings from the LRD, as well as data sets based on matches of workers to the LRD (Hellerstein, etal.
1 999).26
In the results that follow, for each comparison of pairs of samples (i.e., cross-sectional and
longitudinal), or of specifications with different dependent or independent variables, we restrict the
23Thelabor cost measure has three components: wages and salaries; "Required Supplemental Labor Costs," which
are government mandated payroll taxes; and "Voluntary Supplemental Labor Costs," which are employeebenefits.
Other costs associated with labor, such as training, recruiting expenses, etc., are not included in this measure.
24Ifwork effort is also higher, then of course workers could be no better off. However, although this is theoretically
possible, it seems to us a position worth considering seriously only in the face of evidence that workers are actually
not better off. It is clear to us that policy makers, at least, look favorably on workplace changes that raiseworkers
earnings. As another example, we would probably view increased earnings as a result of more training tobe a
positive development, even if the higher earnings ultimately only compensate for training costs (includingdistortion
of the time path of earnings).
25Natural logs are used in all of the regressions, eliminating any role for purely nominal influences.
26Oneperhaps surprising result is the absence of an effect of education on productivity, in AppendixTable A4.
This appears to contradict findings in Black and Lynch (1997) using these same data. However, they alsofind no
30sample to the same set of observations across all regressions in order to ensure that any differences in
results across specifications or across analyses of different variables cannot be attributed to changes in
the sample. We also estimated median regressions to assess the influence of potential outliers in the
data; the results, available on request, were very similar to those presented here.
We report three sets of results: first, for the 1977-1993 panel; second, for the 1977-1996 panel;
and third, for the full 1993 cross-section with additional controls added for workforce characteristics,
which are not available in the 1977 LRD(orother years of the LRD). Although this latter specification
cannot be used to address the issue of establishment-level heterogeneity, and hence does not embody our
main methodological approach, it does give us independent information about the potential role of
workforce characteristics in influencing relationships with establishment outcomes. As noted earlier,
this information is potentially important because of the possibility that establishments implementing
various work practices also change the composition of their workforce in the process. We do this
additional analysis using the 1994 NES because it contains a larger set of questions on work practices, as
shown in Table 1.
Productivity
Table 3 presents regression results relating work practices to sales per worker. Especially
because most of the work practices have a common theme of employee involvement, they may tend to
occur together in the same establishments and present collinearity problems in the empirical analysis.
Therefore, Panel A reports results entering a single work practice separately, or in conjunction with
closely-related practices (i.e., COMPMNG and COMPWKR), along with the control variables but
without any other work practice variables. (In fact, the estimates tended not to be very different, albeit
with somewhat higher standard errors, when the practices were entered jointly. These results are
available on request.) The results for each work practice variable(s) are reported in separate rows
effect of education when they break it up by occupation, which is similar to what we do in constructing an
occupation-weighted average of education to come up with an overall measure.
31(labeled 1, 2, 3, etc.). Columns 1 and 3 report cross-section estimates for the 1993 (column 1) and 1996
(column 3) data that could be successfully matched to the 1977 LRD. Columns 2 and 4 report the first-
difference estimates using the 1977 data as well; recall that while the dependent variable and all of the
control variables are differenced, the work practice variables effectively are not, given the assumption
that these work practices were non-existent in 1977.
Many of the estimated effects appear positive across the alternative estimations. These include
the effects of computer use by workers, meetings to discuss work-related problems, TQM, cross-training
and teamwork training, and pay-for-skill. However, the statistical evidence is weak, as the only work
practice variables showing a relationship with sales per worker at conventional levels of significance are
computer use by workers and job rotation, and unlike all of the other work practice effects, the estimated
effect ofjob rotation is negative. Looking across the set of work practice variables, in most cases
(COMPWKR, MEET, SELFMNG, TQM, TRNTEAM, and PSHR, as well as JOBROT in the 1977-1996
panel), the estimated effect in the differenced equation is less positive than the estimated effect in the
cross-section. This is consistent with unobservables that are positively related to productivity and are
also positively correlated with the adoption of these work practices, a scenario we might expect.
Overall, then, although many of the estimates are consistent with positive productivity effects,
the evidence is weak statistically. The evidence is weakened further by its inconsistency across
specifications and samples. While the estimated effect of job rotation in the 1993 cross-section (column
1) is similar to that for the 1996 cross-section, the first-difference estimate in column 2 is near zero, as is
the cross-section estimate in column 527 Computer use among workers is also positively associated
with sales per worker. The estimates are similar in the two panels, when we difference the data, and
when we do not, although the results are significant only for the 1996 cross-section and the 1977-1996
panel. Here, as well, there is no evidence of an effect in the full 1993 cross-section, perhaps because
27Thedifference in the estimates between columns 1 and 5islargely attributable to the additional control variables,
rather than the additional observations.
32computer use is also associated with changes in workforce composition. Thus, while we do not want to
rule out positive effects of many of these individual work practices on productivity, we do want to
emphasize that there is—in these data—at best a weak case for such an interpretation.
The second half of the table (Panel B) examines potential synergies among the work practice
variables. The set of possible combinations of practices that might provide synergies is very large and,
as noted above, prior research is not consistent in the choice of synergies to explore. To avoid data
mining, all of the synergies in the "bundles" we explore were specified a priori, and results are reported
for all of these whether significant or not. To keep the list of bundles manageable, we chose to examine
first those practices that are intentionally designed to reinforce each other. Teamwork training, for
example, is designed to improve performance in teams and should produce greater performance when
used in combination with the employee meeting and self-managed team variables (specification 13).
Cross-training by definition is designed to help teach other job skills used in the workplace and should
therefore reinforce job rotation, which rotates employees into other tasks (specification 12).
The other synergies we examine are based on arguments from existing literature about the role
that compensation mechanisms can play in supporting other practices. Profit and gainsharing plans that
give employees a financial stake in improved performance help create incentives for them to use the
opportunities that employee involvement creates to act in the interests of the organization.28 Therefore
we might expect to see positive synergies between these plans and employee-involvement
practices—TQM, employee meetings, and self-managed work teams (specification 15). Similar
arguments apply to pay-for-knowledge plans which support learning new workplace skills, which should
be especially useful in situations where jobs are broader—job rotation, self-managed teams, and employee
meetings in general (specification 14). The final synergy we examine is between job rotation and self-
managed teams (specification 11), reflecting the hypotheses that self-managed teams can work more
28
See,e.g., Levine and Tyson (1990) for one of many examples of this argument.
33effectively when employees are able to rotate to the tasks that need doing and that job rotation is more
useful when employees can control, through self-management, when and where to move.29
Including the interactions between the above variables leads to more significant relationships
with the main effects. In specification 11,job rotation is negatively related to sales in both of the 1977-
1996specifications. Its interaction with self-managed teams, however, is positive, although only
significant in the cross-sectional estimates, suggesting that these practices must be used in tandem to
reap productivity benefits. Again, though, we do not get consistent evidencefrom the other panel or the
full 1993 cross-section, so it is difficult to draw strong conclusions from these results. Specifications 14
and 15 yield more consistent results, most notably negative effects of self-managed teams in isolation but
positive effects when combined with profit sharing or pay-for-skill. In specification 15, in particular,
these results are robust across the alternative cross-section and fixed-effects estimates. However, to
assess the total effects of these work practices, we have to take account of both the main and the
interactive effects. Because these results generally go in opposite directions (e.g., self-managed teams,
and its interaction with profit sharing, in specification 15), the interactive effects likely overstate the
gains. We treat the issue of main and interactive effects more formally below when we discuss the more
central issue of the effects of work practices on labor efficiency.
Summarizing the results for productivity suggests that, aside from these results on possible
synergies between profit-sharing or pay-for-skill and self-managed teams, there is relatively little
consistent, statistically significant evidence of beneficial productivity effects of these work practices
based on employee involvement. Many of the estimated main effects in Panel A are positive, suggesting
beneficial effects, but with the exception of computer use by workers,3° none are statistically significant.
This indicates a weak empirical case for productivity gains, although we do not rule out such gains based
on our findings. Further emphasizing the fragility of the statistical evidence, a number of the stronger
29Nodoubt, of course, readers will think of other plausible interactions, including three, four, and other multiple
interactions.
34effects that do emerge in a particular specification are not robust across years of the NES nor when a
more complete set of controls is included. Interestingly, though, first differencing the data to remove
biases from heterogeneity has relative little influence on the estimates; although statistical significance is
sometimes affected, point estimates change by less. If this result is generalizable—and, as noted below, it
tends to hold for labor costs as well—it suggests that heterogeneity bias is not a major factor in the
estimation of effects of work practices, which in turn would imply that cross-sectional data sets are
informative.
Labor Costs
Table 4 presents exactly the same analyses, except this time using log labor costs per worker as
the dependent variable. In Panel A, many more of the variables have significant relationships with the
dependent variable. The significant main effects (for computer use by workers, benchmarking, meetings,
TQM, team training, and profit sharing) are positive, suggesting that these practices raise labor costs.
Moreover, these estimates are generally quite consistent across samples and estimators. In Panel B. in
contrast to the results for specifications 14 and 15 for productivity, the interaction terms are relatively
small and insignificant. However, the pattern of coefficients for specification 11 (in terms of both sign
and significance) is very similar to that in the results for productivity. Again, though, we note that the
estimates with this latter specification are quite different across samples (but not across estimators).
These results might indicate either some gains or no costs from implementing these bundles of work
practices, as productivity appears to be boosted with no effects on costs (specifications 14 and 15) or that
productivity and labor costs move together. We report results that address this question more directly
below.
An overall conclusion from Table 4 might be that many of these high performance work
practices seem to raise labor costs per worker. Because compensation accounts for virtually all labor
costs and the control variables in column 5 include some measures of worker quality (average education
30Thisis also the one consistent finding in Black and Lynch (1997).and tenure, union status, percentage of women and minorities), these relationships appear to raise the
average compensation of otherwise equivalent employees, rather than just resultingin a shift to higher
quality workers. Finally, there are few apparent synergies between practices in their effects on labor
costs per worker.
Labor Efficiency
Table 5 repeats the above analyses using the log of the ratio of sales per worker to labor costs per
worker as the dependent variable. This table effectively combines the two previous analyses, or perhaps
more accurately, examines the effects of work practices on labor efficiency. For example, a positive
effect in this equation implies that productivity rises more than labor costs per worker, which is what we
call an increase in efficiency.31 To aid in interpreting the table, the variables identified in bold italics
are those that had significant relationships with either sales per worker or labor costs per worker in
Tables 3 or 4. When this was the case, the sign of the effects on sales per worker (SW) and labor costs
per worker (LC) are also indicated, whenever possible; these sign"determinations" are based on whether
t-statistics exceeded one with consistent signs of the estimates.32 Note that in the majority of cases, the
signs are in the same direction—both positive—suggesting that where these practices raise labor costs per
worker, they also raise sales per worker, although we know that the latter effects were generally not
statistically significant. Thus, the two should tend to offset each other in their effect on labor efficiency,
although the extent to which there remains evidence of net benefits or net costs of course is an empirical
question, and the evidence is not always in the same direction for sales and labor costs. What we see in
Panel A of Table 5 are, by and large, empirical results consistent with offsetting relationships. There are
essentially no significant main effect relationships, with the possible exception of benchmarking, which
has a negative effect.
Recall that the coefficients are identical to the difference between the results in Tables 3 and 4 but with the
advantage of a simple statistical test of their significance.
32Thenotes to the table provide more details.
36In Panel B, however, there are a number of interactive effects that are statistically significant and
robust across samples and estimators. These include some of the interactive variables already
highlighted in earlier tables, such as the interaction between profit-sharing and self-managed teams,
which in specification 15 has a positive and significant effect on labor efficiency. In addition, some
other interactions appear to have significant effects on labor efficiency in some specifications although
they are generally negative (e.g., the interaction between pay-for-skill and job rotation in specification
14).
One might be tempted, based on these results, to conclude that there appear to be bundles of
work practices that do increase labor efficiency, raising sales per worker by significantly more than labor
costs per worker. In particular, this appears to be true for the implementation of self-managed teams
along with either pay-for-skill or profit sharing. But the net effect of implementing a pair (or more)of
work practices must include the main effects as well. Table 6 therefore reports the effect on labor
efficiency of implementing pairs of practices, for the specifications where there was significant evidence
of positive effects of bundles of work practices—including both the main effects and the interactive
effects. These include the interactions of pay-for-skill with self-managed teams in specification 14 and
the interaction between profit sharing and self-managed teams in specification 15. The more meaningful
numbers are those evaluated at sample means, conditional on use of both practices considered, as these
best represent how practices are typically implemented. These results are reported iii the first row in
each case, although for completeness we also report effects implied by 100-percent implementation.
Because the signs of the interactive coefficients are generally opposite to the signs of the coefficients of
the main effects, there turns out to be no statistically significant evidence that jointly implementing pay-
for-skill or profit sharing along with self-managed teams increases labor efficiency; indeed, the point
estimates are near zero. Even the implied effects of 100-percent implementation are not statistically
significant.
37VIII. Conclusions
How work might be organized so as to benefit employees and employers has been one of the
central questions in social science throughout the past century. Despite the large body of research on this
topic, empirical evidence of relationships between different work practices and outcomes affecting
employers and employees has been extremely limited and has not yielded consistent results. The interest
in measuring these effects has grown considerably during the 1 990s but has been hampered by a series of
difficult methodological challenges largely driven by data limitations.
The analyses presented in this paper offer several advantages over prior efforts to examine the
relationships between work practices and outcomes. First, we are able to examine not only productivity
but also labor costs in order to assess potential benefits to employees as well as the net gain to
employers—captured in increases in labor efficiency—from implementing these practices. Our results,
therefore, can also suggest something about the distribution of benefits between employers and
employees. Second, the fact that the data are from a national probability sample of establishments makes
our results easier to generalize to the economy as a whole. Third, and perhaps most important, the
longitudinal nature of our data and its ability to measure performance before practices could reasonably
be expected to have been introduced—in some cases before the practices were even known—offers a
superior approach to controlling for heterogeneity as compared with prior studies.
Prior research on the effects of work practices presents a more mixed and less complete picture
than is sometimes assumed. Earlier work focusing on psychological models found that practices
associated with employee involvement, broadly defined, showed important benefits for employees but
little evidence of benefits to employers. The more recent research on the productivity effects associated
with work practices offers greater evidence of benefits to employers. The number of studies is relatively
small, however, and many look only at productivity, as opposed to net effects that include some
assessment of cost effects. Huselid (1995) offers perhaps the strongest evidence of net financial benefits
38to employers that is associated with work practices, albeit not necessarily with employeeinvolvement
practices. But the cross-sectional nature of his data and the fact that the resultsdid not hold up with the
longitudinal extension of the data suggests the need to revisit the question. The special designof our
longitudinal analysis makes it especially suited to address the Huselid and Becker (1996) critiquethat
panel data may offer no improvement over cross-sectional data in testing forthese relationships.
The results of our analyses, as noted above, suggest that the effects of these work practices on
productivity appear to be positive, consistent with other recent research, althoughin our data little or
none of this evidence is statistically significant. At the same time, there arebenefits to employees from
innovative work practices based on employee involvement in the form of higher labor costs/higher
compensation. The fact that our analyses provide some controls for labor quality makes itclearer that
the relationship is driven by the practices themselves and not by the related effect of using higher-
quality, more expensive labor. Finally, there is no evidence of net benefits to employersassociated with
these practices, as labor cost increases tend to offset any productivity increases that may occur. On the
other hand, neither is there evidence of net costs to employers associated with using these practices. Our
results, then, parallel those of the earlier studies of work practices based at the individual level,
suggesting gains to workers but providing little evidence of effects on organizational performance.And
they replicate the findings of at least one contemporary industry study using organizational-leveldata
(Appelbaum, et al., forthcoming). If one party to the employment relationship benefitsfrom these
practices without necessarily imposing costs on the other, there may be a Pareto improvementfrom
innovative work practices, although of course our data cannot definitively address this welfare
calculation.
Where our results may appear to be most at odds with the prior literature concerns the hypothesis
about positive synergies between individual work practices. To be fair to the prior literature, however,
the evidence for synergies comes only from productivity studies done in the context of particular
39production processes and work practices, and the synergies are not identical across studies. The studies
by Huselid (1995) and Black and Lynch (1997) that examine synergies among a representative
population of employers find little evidence of these relationships. The latter, for example, find only one
significant interaction and that only with the additional contingency of unionization.33 Supporters of the
notion that there are synergies between practices might well argue that different combinations of
practices might reveal evidence of synergies. Short of testing every possible combination of work
practices (at least nine such practices in our data) and every contingency (by industry, by union status,
etc.) this theoretical possibility will always remain. But the fact that we find no evidence of synergies
even among the most obvious and theoretically-grounded interactions is surely among the strongest
evidence that is practical to bring to bear on this question.
Finally, it is constructive to think about our evidence from the perspective of employers
contemplating the implementation of "high performance" work practices. While it is important to keep
in mind the caveat that—statistically—a failure to find significant effects does not establish that there are
no effects, our evidence suggests that such work practices do not affect labor efficiency (output per
dollar of labor costs). Thus, despite raising labor costs/compensation, implementing such work practices
should not hurt competitiveness, Indeed, it is possible that "high performance" work practices have
other beneficial consequences (higher morale, greater adaptability, lower waste, etc.) that either do not
affect firm performance measurably or do so in ways not captured by our performance measures. But the
case for such assertions remains speculative.
In addition, the estimated main effect of unionization is strongly negative, emphasizing the point made in the
previous section that combined main and interactive effects may be much smaller than suggested by a large
interactive effect.
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York, NY: Rawson Associates.Appendix: Anecdotal Evidence and Initial Reports on the Introduction of
Innovative Work Practices
Ourapproachto estimating the causal effects of work practices on establishment performance
relies on the assertion that such practices were not present in U.S. establishments to any measurable
extent as of 1977. Evidence for this assertion, in addition to the material presented in the main text, is
presented below, separately for each aspect of work organization analyzed in the text.
TQM: Total quality management is a concept based on Japanese manufacturing practices and articulated
by a series of authors, most notably Edwards Deming, whose first publication in English for a mass
audience on the subject was in 1984 (Deming 1984). In terms of practice in the West, it appears to have
evolved from the quality circle movement in the early l980s and was first recognized as a movement in
companies in the late 1980s. (See, e.g., Hill 1991, and Harris 1995, for evidence on the rise of TQM as a
movement.) The first account of a TQM program in the U.S. that we found in the popular press was at
the Allen-Bradley company in 1987 where it was referred to as TQMS, for "total quality management
system" (PR NEWSWIRE 1987). The first survey of firms that asks about the incidence of TQM was in
1990 (Grant Thorton 1991).
Pay-for-Skill: This concept was first presented in 1985 as part of a more general critique by Edward
Lawler of U.S. compensation practices. It was originally known as "skill-based pay" (Lawler 1985).
The first account of a company using pay-for-skill is General Mills in 1991 (Ledford and Bergel 1991).
Job Rotation: This term has one of the longer legacies among work practice innovations. Academic
interest in job rotation appears to begin in the late l960s with the argument that job rotation may reduce
boredom among employees performing simple tasks. The first academic reference we find to theconcept is in a very short note in 1968 in the context of implications for expanding shift work, which
argues that job rotation may equally have negative affects on individual performance depending on the
circumstances (Wilkerson and Edwards 1968). In the mid-1970s there were some experiments with job
rotation as part of more general experiments in job enrichment, but they also seemed rare enough to
merit articles about individual experiments (e.g., King 1974)J These experiments in job design were
essentially abandoned by the late 1970s because employers found that they did not translate into gains
for the organization.2 The improvements observed were mainly in the attitudes of individual employees
and, to a lesser extent, in performance measures at the individual level, such as turnover and absenteeism
(see main text). The revival of interest in job rotation came with the interest in Japanese management
practices in the late 1980s, in which job rotation was a part of a set of practices that included teamwork
and continuous improvement, or Kaizan.
Cross-Training: The notion of cross-training would seem to be driven primarily by the interest in moving
employees across different jobs, and to be closely related to job rotation. Job rotation when initially
introduced referred to assembly line and other low-skill jobs where no additional skills were needed to
perform in the other positions. Cross-training was initially introduced to refer specifically to situations
where different jobs could not be performed without new skills. The first mention that we can find of an
instance of cross-training is at Delta Airlines in 1980, where cross-training is presented as an
intervention in helping employees understand how their individual jobs contribute to the overall goals of
During the 1970s, the business press sometimes referred to executive development programs where managers were
moved through different areas of the corporation in order to get experience as "job rotation," but this is a very
different notion from the modern definition that refers to a regular movement across discrete job tasks, typically for
production work, on a long-term or permanent basis.
2Duringthe 973-75 recession, some companies (particularly those with unions) went to a four-day week in an
effort to avoid more severe layoffs. In the process of shortening the workweek, work assignments were often
changed, and workers sometimes had to rotate across jobs in order to get the work done. Job rotation was an
unintended consequence of this process and was frequently discussed in the business press (e.g., Feron 1974). But it
was not the design of company policies nor was it conducted in ways that were designed to produce the effects
associated with modern job rotation. Virtually all companies soon dropped their experiments with shortened
workweeks and the job rotation that resulted from them.
iithe company (Dow Jones New Service 1980). The first academic mention of cross-training appears to be
in 1986 (Gotz and Stanton 1986).
Benchmarking: No doubt the informal process of making comparisons with practices at other
organizations is as old as time. But the systematic attempt to learn and copy individual practices from
organizations that are seen as leaders in those areas (irrespective of whether they are competitors), and
the term "benchmarking," is generally acknowledged to have begun in the corporate world in 1981 with
the Xerox Corporation's efforts to improve its sliding competitive position against Japanese competitors
(Jacobson and Hillkirk 1986). By the end of the 1980s, benchmarking was widespread and seen as an
integral part of efforts to improve organizational performance (Fray 1988).
Self-Managed Teams: A subset of teamwork is self-managed teams, where the members of the team go
beyond working together to manage themselves, taking on most of the responsibilities of supervision and
directing their own work. The first mention of self-managed teams we can find is in 1989 (Luthans and
Fox 1989), in an article about pay-for-skill. The article generally credited with bringing the concept to
popular attention came in 1990 (Dumaine 1990), where self-managed teams are described as a "still
controversial innovation" that only a few companies had experimented with during the 1980s.
Meetings: The concept of employees organized in regularly scheduled meetings to discuss workplace
problems is obviously broad in its scope. But there is still little evidence that such arrangements existed
before the 1980s. Quality circles seem to be the best-known common practice that fits this definition.
Cotton (1993) indicates that two U.S. companies experimented with quality circle principles in the mid-
1970s. Otherwise, the practice began to spread with the interest in Japanese management beginning in
the mid-1980s. Stronger examples of scheduled meetings in the form of teams seem equally rare. One
Illestimate suggests that there were no more than 24 plants in the U.S. that had team work principles in
1976 (Hoerr 1986).
Gainsharing/Profit Sharing: The notion of sharing performance improvements with employees certainly
has the longest academic history of any of the innovative workplace practices. Some gainsharing plans
clearly were in operation before 1977, although the number of employers with such plans appears to have
been very small. Perhaps the most popular incarnation of gainsharing ideas were those put forward by
Joseph Scanlon in the 1950s and subsequently continued and adapted by his followers. Scanlon plans
were almost entirely in unionized facilities. Cotton (1993) estimates that perhaps 500 companies have at
one time adopted Scanlon plans, although it is difficult to know how many of those were in place before
1977. Reviews of specific gainsharing plans come up with reasonably small numbers—44 Scanlon plans
in 1975 (National Commission on Productivity and Work Quality 1975), 72 examples of Improshare in
1982 (Fein 1982)—although these studies were not necessarily designed to establish the incidence in the
population. The New York Stock Exchange survey figure noted above found roughly 4 percent of firms
withsome profit sharing in 1982. It is quite possible that some of the establishments in the 1977 LRD
datamay have had profit or gainsharing plans. But it also seems likely that the percentage with such
plans was very small, especially as compared to the percentage that had them in 1994 (approximately 60
percent of establishments).
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 Table 3: Work Practice OLS Regressions for Log of Sales/Worker, Manufacturing Plants






































TRNTEAMX -.270 -.280 -.040
SELFMNG (.239) (.244) (.198)

































































































































B.Work Practices Bundled (continued)
1977-1993panel 1977-1996 panel Full 1993 cross section.
1993 Differenced 1996 Differenced with additional controls
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5)
14. PAYSKIL -.056 -.103 -.096
(.125) (.122) (.100)
MEET .037 -.007 .035
(.067) (.066) (.054)
JOBROT -.059 .029 .048
(.101) (.101) (.079)
SELFMNG -.113 -.171 -.150
(.122) (.123) (.099)
PAYSKILX .159 .334' .054
MEET (.198) (.199) (.149)
PAYSKILX -.264 -.133 -.268
JOBROT (.328) (.328) (.221)
PAYSKILx .436 .236 .489'
SELFMNG (.295) (.300) (.227)
15.PSHR .099 -.034 .073
(.064) (.065) (.051)
TQM .091 .017 .l31
(.073) (.073) (.059)
MEET .058 .092 -.000
(.089) (.089) (.074)
SELFMNG -.282 -.467' -.259
(.181) (.182) (.126)
PSHRX -.134 .018 -188'
TQM (.098) (.099) (.079)
PSHR>< .007 -.091 .069
MEET (.122) (.124) (.098)
PSHRX .417' .615' .381"
SELFMNG (.237) (.239) (.172)
N 433 433 660 660 663
Eachnumbered set of work practice variableswasentered separately.Incolumns (1)-(4), the other control variablesincludedare productionfunction inputs.
establishment age (for 1993 only), and dummy variables for two-digit industries, whether the plant belongs to a multi-plant firm, and whether in the 1993 datathe
labor cost andemploymentdata came from the 1992 LRD. In column (5) additional controls for age of the capital stock andnumerousworkforcc charactcristics are
added.Descriptive statistics for these variables are reported in Appendix Tables A2 and A3, and estimated coefficients of these variables for the specifications
corresponding to those in this table andTables4 and 5, but excluding the work practice variables, are reported in Appendix Table A4. In Panel B, the /1 00's
omitted from the variable name, although these variables (MEET, JOBROT, SELFMING, and PAYSKIL) are always divided by 100. '*'indicatesstatistical
significance at the ten-percent level, and '**'statisticalsignificance at the five-percent level, in two-sided tests.Table 4: WorkPracticeOLS Regressions for Log of Labor Costs/Worker, Manufacturing Plants


















































































































































































B. Work Practices Bundled (continued)
1977-1993 panel 1977-1996 panel Full 1993 cross section.
1993 Differenced i22 Differenced with additional controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
14. PAYSKIL -.020 -.054 .007
(.075) (.063) (.056)
MEET .049 .015 .025
(.041) (.034) (.030)
JOBROT -.118 -.014 -.080•
(.061) (.052) (.044)
SELFMNG .095 -.010 .029
(.074) (.063) (.055)
PAYSK1L -.016 .041 -.124
MEET (.120) (.103) (.083)
PAYSKILX .259 .222 .147
JOBROT (.198) (.169) (.123)
PAYSKILX -.114 -.143 .052
SELFMNG (.178) (.154) (.127)
15. PSHR .044 .019 .048
(.038) (.033) (.028)
TQM .112" .100" .103"
(.044) (.037) (.033)
MEET -.044 -.026 -.062
(.053) (.045) (.041)
SELFMNG .086 -.161 -.030
(.108) (.093) (.070)
PSHR< -.050 -.059 -.036
TQM (.059) (.05 1) (.044)
PSHR .117 .049 .065
MEET (.073) (.063) (.054)
PSHR>< -.099 .152 .056
SELFMNG (.142) (.122) (.095)
N 433 433 660 660 663
See notes to Table 3.Table 5 Work Practice OLS Regressions for (Log of Sales/Worker -LogLabor Costs/Worker), Manufacturing Plants
A. Individual Work Practices
Full 1993 cross section.
1977-1993 panel 1977-1996 panel with additional controls
SW/LC1993IJifferenced SW/LC1996 Differenced SW/LC 1993
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
I. COMPMNGIIOO -.095 -.106 .069 -.000 -.030
(.081) (.083) (.110)(.108) (.065)
COMPWKR/100 -.050 .065 +1+ .032 -.030 ?/? -.115
(.082)(.084) (.104)(.100) (.074)
2. BENCH +1+ -.050 -.098 -.030 -.082 21± -.041
(.046)(.048) (.060) (.058) (.040)
3. MEET/100 .026 .033 +1+ -.033 -.063 .051
(.055)(.056) (.067) (.066) (.047)
4. JOBROT/100 -.035 -.018 -7- -.003 -.020 .050
(.083)(.086) (.090) (.089) (.067)
5. SELFMINGI100 -.045 -.018 .034 .039 -.039
(.093)(.098) (.102)(.101) (.077)
6. TQM 71+ -.059 -.035 +7+ -.044
(.048)(.048) (.040)
7. TRNCROS .029 .046 -.005
(.053) (.056) (.044)
8. TRNTEAM +7+ -.012 -.022 ?I+ -.017
(.054) (.055) (.043)
9. PAYSKIL/100 .060 .100 -.024
(.077) (.080) (.062)
10. PSHR +1+ .010 -.037 +1+ -.006
(.045) (.048) (.038)
B. Work Practice Bundles
11. JOBROT -.047 -.020 -I- -.041 .010 .053
(.093) (.098) (.107)(.105) (.079)
SELFMNG ?/± -.069 -.022 -.015 .101 ?/± -.064
(.1 18)(.124) (.135)(.134) (.102)
JOBROTX -I- .107 .024 +7+ .164 -.186 ?/2 .033
SELFMNG (.258)(.274) (.283)(.284) (.198)
12. TRNCROS .000 .037 -.010
(.059)(.062) (.049)
JOBROT -.196 -.069 .034
(.154)(.165) (.138)
TRNCROSX .222 .066 .021
JOBROT (.182)(.195) (.156)
13. TRNTEAM .036 -.014 .020
(.068)(.071) (.057)
MEET .107 .026 .092
(.117)(.124) (.085)
SELFMNG .268 .283 .160
(.200) (.217) (.178)
TRNTEAM< -.085 .033 -.047
MEET (.133) (.142) (.102)
TRNTEAMX -.415 -.398 77+ -.257
SELFMNG (.228)(.245) (.197)Table 5 (continued)
B.Work Practices Bundled (continued)
Full1993 cross section.
1977-1993 panel 1977-1996 panel with additional controls
SW/LC1993Differenced SW/LC1996 Differenced SW/LC 1993
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
14. PAYSKIL -.036 -.049 -.104
(.119) (.123) (.100)
MEET -.012 -.022 .011
(.064) (.066) (.054)
JOBROT ?I- .059 .043 2/— 128
(.096) (.101) (.079)
SELFMNG -.209 -.161 -.179
(.116)(.123) (.098)
PAYSKILx +1? .175 .293 ?/— .178
MEET (.189)(.200) (.149)
PAYSKILX -.523 -.355 -.415
JOBROT (.3 12)(.329) (.220)
PAYSKILx .550 .379 +12 437*
SELFMNG (.281)(.301) (.226)
15. PSHR .055 -.053 .025
(.061)(.065) (.051)
TQM +1+ -.021 -.083 +1+ .028
(.070) (.073) (.059)
MEET .102 .119 .062
(.084)(.089) (.074)
SELFMNG -.368".306* /? -.230
(.172) (.183) (.126)
PSI-IRX -.084 .077 -I? -.151
TQM (.094) (.100) (.079)
PSHR'< -.110 -.140 .004
MEET (.117) (.125) (.098)
PSHRx +1+ .516** .463* +1? .325
SELFMNG (.227) (.241) (.172)
N 433 433 660 660 663
Seenotes to Table 3. Variables for which there were significant effects of work practices (at the ten-percent level or better) in Tables 3 and 4are highlighted In
columns (I) and (4), for these highlighted variables the signs of the effects on sales/worker (SW) or labor costs/worker (LC) from the cross-section and difhrenced
estimates are indicated if they can be established based on t-statistics exceeding one; a '2' is reported if either the sign cannot be established orthere are both positive
and negative estimates with t-values exceeding one (otherwise the sign of the coefficient estimate with the t-value exceeding one is reported). In column (7) thesame
is done, based only on the cross-sectional estimates in column (5) of Tables 3 and 4.Table 6: Statistical Tests for Effects of Work Practice Bundles on (Log of Sales/Worker -LogLabor Costs/Worker), Manufacturing Plants
1977-1993 panel Full 1993 cross section
P-value P-value
Estimated effect (null: effect =0) Estimated effect (null: effect =0)
j Differenced 1993 Differenced 1993 1993
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification14:
PAYSKIL and SELFMNG
Evaluated at sample means, 015 -.009 .86 .91 -.032 .66
conditional on use of both practices
Evaluated at 100% implementation .306 .169 .25 .55 .154 .47
Specification IS:
PSHR and SELFMNG
Evaluatedatsamplemeans, .123 .019 .14 .83 .064 .33
conditional on use of both practices
Evaluated at 100% implementation .203 .104 .15 .49 .121 .30
Tests are based on estimates reported in Table 5. Specification numbers refer to that table. For the first entry for each interaction, the estimated effectis the suns of
level and interaction effects, evaluated at sample means of work practice variables conditional on these being greater than zero, with means treated as fixed, Eor
example, in the first row, the estimated effect is (bPAYSKs:PAYSKIL' + bSIIFMN&SELEMNG' +bpAysKa.sny('PAYSKlL"SELEMNG'),where the b's arc thc
regression estimates, and a prime indicates a conditional sample mean. The p-value is from the Wald statistic of the null hypothesis that this linear combinationof
the regression coefficients equals zero. In the second row, 100% implementation is assumed.Appendix Table Al: NES Manufacturing Analysis Samples
1994NES 1997 NES
(1) (2)
Full NES sample of interviews 3165 4397
Manufacturing subsample of NES 1727 2536
Delete bad/missing data:
Workforce characteristics 1342 1956
Establishment characteristics and 748 1229
performance
Computer use work practices 738 1216
Benchmark, job rotation, and self- 725 1160
managed teams work practices
Meeting work practices 719 1142
1994 NES only:
Pay for skill or knowledge and 703
profit/gain-sharing work practices
Team and cross training and TQM 701
work practices
Obtain labor costs from 1992/1993 LRDs 663
Match to 1977 LRD 433 660
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